

# **Cohen on Logic-Based Therapy and Virtues**

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## **Introduction**

In this essay, I will be concerned to discuss Elliot D. Cohen's psychotherapeutic approach, which he calls Logic-Based Therapy and his alliance to the relative new movement called "positive psychology." In the simplest of terms, Cohen's psychotherapeutic approach begins with a discussion of the eleven cardinal fallacies and ends with placing an emphasis on eleven guiding virtues which correspond respectively to each fallacy. I will proceed by spelling out the relationship between Cohen's Logic-Based Therapy and the corresponding guiding virtues. After that, I will bring into focus a challenge to this relationship, viz., I will argue that because Cohen links Logic-Based Therapy to the virtues, his psychotherapeutic approach cannot remain morally neutral toward the counselee. This, I will try to show, is inconsistent with an important moral goal of cognitive psychology. Finally, I will set out a possible response to the above challenge. I will argue that while it is true that Cohen links LBT to a virtue moral theory, there is a way to understand his viewpoint that may avoid the problem of not remaining morally neutral toward the counselee.

## **Cohen on the Relationship between Logic-Based Therapy and the Virtues**

Over a number of years, Elliot D. Cohen, Ph.D., has put together a unique psychotherapeutic theory called Logic-Based Therapy (LBT). Historically speaking, LBT is a derivative of Albert Ellis' Rational Emotive Behavioral Therapy (REBT).<sup>1</sup> Like REBT, LBT holds that there is a relationship R that binds together an individual's beliefs, emotions and behaviors. Unlike REBT, which defines the relationship R in causal terms, LBT defines the relationship in logical terms. This means that instead of talking in causal terms between beliefs, emotions and behaviors, LBT states that individuals deduce emotional states from beliefs, and, ultimately, individuals deduce behaviors from their emotional states.

Taxonomically speaking, then, LBT has its roots in the quasi-philosophical approach of Ellis and REBT. With this in mind, however, unlike REBT and CBT, LBT adds to its modality an unusual idea, viz., LBT adds, what Cohen calls a "positive psychology."<sup>2</sup> Of course, even as Cohen makes clear,<sup>3</sup> the notion of "positive psychology" has its origin the work of Martin E. P. Seligman and M. Csikszentmihalyi.<sup>4</sup> The question is why Cohen aligns, so to speak, LBT to "positive psychology." The answer is that the proponents of "positive psychology" argue that traditional psychology has lost its way.<sup>5</sup> That is, traditional psychology "concentrates on repairing damage with a disease model of human functioning."<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately, because of such a narrow focus, it "neglects the fulfilled individual and thriving community."<sup>7</sup> So the reason why Cohen partially aligns LBT to "positive psychology" is that he shares the same commitment to fostering excellence and positive personal traits in the counselees who seek help in a counseling context.

Although Cohen shares the same outlook with the advocates of "positive psychology," he is also critical of the movement itself. But why is this so? Cohen makes clear that "positive psychology," and even Seligman, focus on solving a counselee's "mental disturbance through [the] recognition and nurturance of a positive psychology at the expense of identifying and

treating the self-defeating, irrational ideas of counselees who are already suffering from cognitive, behavioral and emotional problems.<sup>8</sup>

So far, then, Cohen aligns LBT to REBT and CBT because both psychotherapies focus on rooting out the irrational ideas of counseling, and he lines up LBT to “positive psychology” because of its focus on well-being and happiness of the counselee. That said, Cohen is critical of both modalities, viz., against REBT and CBT. REBT neglects the positive side available to psychology, and, against Seligman and “positive psychology,” they neglect the serious problems fallacies can contribute to the overall unhappiness of a counselee. With these comments in place, I will now turn to Cohen’s own involvement to “positive psychology.”

Cohen’s advancement to “positive psychology” emphasizes “a set of guiding virtues.”<sup>9</sup> Although a discussion of the nature of the virtues seems necessary, such a discussion would be too lengthy. Instead, I will try to make clear Cohen’s understanding of what he calls the guiding virtues. Cohen’s interpretation of the virtues partly relies on Aristotle’s understanding of virtues. There are four salient features to make clear. First, Cohen sees the virtues as moral ideals which counselees can aspire to. Such a view, Cohen explains, can lead counselees “to a higher level of human functioning.”<sup>10</sup> Second, in traditional Aristotelian terms, Cohen makes clear that the virtues he recommends are “an Aristotelian ‘golden mean’ between excess and deficiency.”<sup>11</sup> Of course, as Cohen further explains, attaining such an outlook may be hard to attain in a counseling context because of the counselee’s weakness of the will. Cohen recommends numerous behavioral technics which can help the counselee establish new habits.<sup>12</sup> Third, as we might expect from a virtue approach to do, Cohen’s viewpoint does not take deontic judgments or principles as basic; rather, his position takes as basic, what are typically described as *aretaic* judgments.<sup>13</sup> For example, of courage, Cohen writes: “courageous persons are . . . morally

committed individuals and will not sacrifice their convictions where it is easier or more profitable to do so.”<sup>14</sup> Finally, initially Cohen used the term “transcendent” to describe the status of the virtues. Without delving into the texts where Cohen uses the term “transcendent,” it may be tempting to interpret him as stating something about the metaphysical status of the virtue, viz., that the virtues exist beyond the limits of ordinary experience. That would be an erroneous impression; rather, Cohen means that the virtues provide *guidance* in the sense that they are moral ideals that help people move to a higher level of excellence.<sup>15</sup>

Having briefly discussed Cohen’s notion of virtue, it is now time to discuss what specific virtues he brings to LBT. There are two basic sets of virtues: a set of behavioral and emotional virtues<sup>16</sup> and a set of inductive virtues.<sup>17</sup> Before I spell out this discussion, it should be noted that the content or outlook of each virtue is derived from its connection to a fallacy. LBT begins, in a sense, by noting that a large part of the mental disturbances people suffer from can be explained by identifying one or more fallacies. Of these fallacies, Cohen writes:

. . . these fallacies represent a class consisting of *irrational assumptions and misuses of language contain in the premises of arguments*. The characteristic mark of these assumptions and linguistic errors is that they have a *long, proven track record of frustrating personal and interpersonal happiness*. That is, they tend to have dangerous and self-destructive consequences.<sup>18</sup>

He lists eleven fallacies, eight, of which are behavioral and emotional fallacies and three are inductive fallacies. The first set of fallacies are 1. Demanding Perfection, 2. Jumping on the bandwagon, 3. The-world-revolves-around-me, 4. Catastrophic Reasoning, 5. Damnation, 6.

*Can't*stipation, 7. Dutiful Worrying, and 8. Manipulation. The three inductive fallacies are 1. Oversimplifying Reality, 2. Distorting Probabilities, and 3. Blind Conjecture.<sup>19</sup>

As I noted above, the virtues take their cue, so speak, by seeking to guide the counselee toward a better way of living. So, for example, of the behavior and emotional fallacies, metaphysical security guides the counseling away from demanding perfection, jumping on the bandwagon is replaced with authenticity, the-world-revolves-around-me switches to empathy, courage supplants catastrophic reasoning, respect swaps out damnation, temperance is substituted for *can't*stipation, prudence is traded for dutiful worrying, and empowerment unseats manipulation. There are the virtues for the inductive fallacies: objectivity succeeds oversimplifying reality, foresightedness casts off distorting probabilities, and scientificity is substituted for blind conjecture.<sup>20</sup>

Although it would take too much time to spell out the relationship between each fallacy and the corresponding virtue, I will illustrate his viewpoint with one example, viz., demanding perfection and metaphysical security. The fallacy of demanding perfection is complicated so I will only give a brief description of it. An individual caught, so to speak, by the fallacy of demanding perfection, typically has problems “accepting the imperfections in reality.”<sup>21</sup> For example, such an individual may have problems accepting his own limitations, the imperfections of others, or the imperfections of the world. Such an individual tends to experience a deep sense of emotional insecurity because of, e.g., an irrational belief: “Bad things must never happen to me.”<sup>22</sup> Thus, in the face of such a belief, when bad things do happen, the counselee deduces a serious emotional response captured by sentences like “I can’t stand this,” or “This is the worst thing that has ever happened to me.” Sometimes both responses are deduced. Whatever the case may be, the counselor (or consultant)<sup>23</sup> will focus on the original irrational belief and attempt to

provide a clear refutation and an antidote. The refutation points to why the belief is false and the antidote supplies a more rational belief. So, for example, the counselor (or consultant) may remind the counselee that such an outlook is irrational because it is impossible to guarantee that nothing bad will ever happen to you. Additionally, to provide a more rational outlook, the counselor (or consultant) will apply an antidote from the History of Philosophy, say, from perhaps the Stoic philosopher, Epictetus, who reminds us (in the simplest of terms) to give up what we can't control.<sup>24</sup> With the antidote in place, which is chosen specifically because it endorses metaphysical security, it may now be easier to guide the counselee toward metaphysical security by helping them to develop the "habit of accepting the imperfections in reality."<sup>25</sup>

### **A Challenge to Cohen's Link between Logic-Based Therapy and the Virtues**

After completing a brief discussion of the relationship between LBT and the virtues it endorses, it is now time to turn to challenge the link between LBT and the virtues. The challenge comes to this:

1. Cohen links together a psychotherapy and a moral theory, viz., a version of a virtue theory.
2. If line 1 is true, then LBT cannot remain morally neutral toward its counselees.

So, LBT cannot remain morally neutral toward its counselees.<sup>26</sup>

I will begin by giving reasons why lines 1 and 2 are true. Let's begin with line 2 first. If we suppose for the sake of argument that the antecedent is true, viz., that he links together a psychotherapy and his version of a virtue moral theory, then empowering a counselee includes not only their first-order autonomy, but also their second-order autonomy. That said, if

empowering a counselee includes not only their first-order autonomy, but also their second-order autonomy, then LBT cannot remain morally neutral toward its counsees. So line 2 is true.

Before I move on to line 1, I should say a little more about the justification of line 2. It certainly needs further explanation. The justification of line 2 brings out the serious drawback of linking a moral theory to a psychotherapy. Here's what I mean. It is generally thought that a counselor's goal is to empower his counselee's autonomy.<sup>27</sup> Briefly, this means (at least) two things. Counselors of this stripe follow the obligation not to let or to encourage the counselee to become dependent upon them to make decisions. Rather, they encourage client self-determination.<sup>28</sup> Second, the focus on self-determination is what Kupfer and Klatt call "first-order" autonomy.<sup>29</sup> What this means is that the counselor only focuses his efforts to enhance the autonomous decision making process of his counsees on the "everyday level of particular choices and action."<sup>30</sup> Of course, to argue that there is only one focus implies that there may be another focus. There certainly is such a focus.

The other focus, which Kupfer and Klatt discuss and concentrate on, is the "second-order autonomy of the counselee. According to Kupfer and Klatt, this means that "This is the ability to reflect critically on the values and commitments which underlie our first-order decision."<sup>31</sup> Naturally, from a philosophical point of view, such an endeavor is an expected extension of our craft. Philosophers, in general, in their own personal moments of reflection, and even to a certain extent, in their efforts to teach critical thinking to our students, aim at the critical assessment of "second-order" values. Nonetheless, as Kupfer and Klatt, make clear, such a focus is off limits in a counseling situation. But why is this the case? Although there are exceptions, Kupfer and Klatt make clear that, the average (cognitive) counselor, with no philosophical or theological training, does not really know how and why counsees come to hold their deep-seated values.<sup>32</sup>

Moreover, the next point is aimed at psychologists who may also be trained in philosophy. The point is simple: It's not fair to require an individual to critically assess their "second-order" values with no training to do so. Such an attack may be disastrous to the average counselee who relies on his values to interpret the world.<sup>33</sup>

The question now is this: How is this related to the point in line 2? If we suppose that the antecedent is true, then aligning a moral theory to a psychotherapy violates the obligation to remain morally neutral toward the counselee's "second-order" values. But why is this the case? The answer revolves around the idea of what moral theories are meant to provide. For example, an ethical theory, whether agent-based or action-based, provides ultimate ethical justification for the normative status of the character of an individual or the action of an individual. Here's what I mean. Several years ago, I confronted an individual who tortured cats for fun. Initially, I attacked him with Mill's mental-state hedonism. Unfortunately, he didn't see anything wrong with causing unnecessary suffering. I switch very quickly to Aristotle's virtue theory and discussed the importance of temperance. I pointed out that temperance is concerned with, among other things, the proper role of pleasure.<sup>34</sup> Although he didn't like what I said, I made it clear that the habituation of this unjustified pleasure of causing unnecessary suffering was inconsistent with the goal of happiness, and, as a result, it was leading him to make terrible choices. In other words, the virtue theory of Aristotle led me to attack his "second-order" values, viz., his pleasure to cause suffering, because he used his values to make "first-order" decisions. This is just what moral theories do!

But now the point against Cohen and LBT should be a little clearer. If I am correct that moral theories are directed at the "first-order" *and* the "second-order" values of moral agents, then LBT lacks a morally neutral outlook. If there is still doubt, Cohen includes in his virtue



theory the virtue of temperance.<sup>35</sup> Although Cohen spins temperance to work in his psychotherapy, he still aligns it very closely to Aristotle's version:

As Aristotle realized, temperance involves not only having the strength of will to overcome "bad appetites." Instead, a person with temperance does not even *have* these "bad" passions. Thus, a preliminary stage in reaching a measure of temperance is to work on overcoming cognitive dissonance between irrational inclinations and what one knows to be rational.<sup>36</sup>

So far I have only assumed that line 1 was true. I will now turn to spell out why line 1 is true. This, I think, is not easy to demonstrate. The problem is that the truth of line 1 doesn't turn on the fact that Cohen just employs a set of virtues to enhance his positive psychology. On the contrary, one might argue that a set of guiding virtues does not a virtue theory make. Instead, what I need to do is show why his set of virtues together form a *theory*, and, thus, an ethics of virtue. If I can do this, then this will go a long way to showing that line 1 is true. But how shall I proceed?

The way to proceed will be to focus on what counts as the component parts which make something a theory about the virtues, and then see whether Cohen's cluster of virtues satisfies that theory. Thus, the approach I plan to take is intuitive in nature.<sup>37</sup> Although such a discussion is too long for this paper, the following components may be helpful to correctly characterize a virtue theory approach. First, such a theory should be teleological in nature. This means that such a theory, whether agent-based or action-based, "make the right, the obligatory, and the morally good dependent on the nonmorally good."<sup>38</sup> The nonmoral good in either case is typically

identified as happiness. Second, it should be agent-based and not action-based. To make such a distinction is to separate a virtue account from a consequentialist account. For example, whereas a consequentialist account, say, like Mill's mental-state hedonist teleology,<sup>39</sup> focuses on the consequences *actions* generate, a virtue account focuses primarily on the value that persons possess or traits of character individual's may have.<sup>40</sup> Third, virtues theories make clear that the character traits it endorses are not innate, but must be acquired and habituated.<sup>41</sup> Finally, unlike action-based theories, whether teleological or deontological, which emphasize duty, virtue theories employ *aretaic* judgments. So, whereas action-based theories make moral judgments like "We ought to keep our promises," virtue theories make judgments like "His action was vicious."<sup>42</sup>

Although I do not intend to claim this is an exhaustive intuitive account of what all virtue theory accounts have in common, intuitively speaking, it does seem to capture some of the features which are necessary. That said, does Cohen's virtue account satisfy these four conditions? I think it does. Let's turn to that discussion now.

First, is Cohen's virtue account teleological in nature, and does he employ the concept of happiness to capture this description? The answer is yes, and there is textual evidence. Cohen, first, links his positive psychology to the virtue accounts of Plato and Aristotle.<sup>43</sup> Additionally, Cohen relates his account of the virtues to the attainment of happiness: "Philosophical theories, in their capacity as antidotes to the Cardinal Fallacies, can provide useful guides to the attainment of the virtues, and accordingly to human happiness."<sup>44</sup> Finally, Cohen makes clear the connection in a footnote: "Thus, LBT's analysis of human happiness resembles that of Aristotle who also provided a virtue-based account of happiness in terms of intellectual (cognitive) and moral (emotional) development."<sup>45</sup>

What about the second requirement? Although Cohen doesn't make use of the agent-based/action-based distinction, he appears to have this in mind. This is so because throughout the discussion of his text, Cohen makes clear that the virtues he endorses points a counselee toward a "higher level of human functionality," to "higher-order human capability or 'excellence'," to "become happier human beings," to "human happiness," and so forth.<sup>46</sup>

Cohen also endorses the third requirement: "LBT holds that each of these 'virtues' is a habit or disposition acquired through practice, comprising a higher-order human capability or 'excellence'."<sup>47</sup>

What about the last condition? Does he employ *aretaic* judgments? This is pretty clear throughout his discussion of the individual virtues. Although I briefly mentioned Cohen's view of courage earlier (and temperance), I will bring up a few more details about his view of courage. Reminiscent of Aristotle's discussion, courageous individuals are individuals who confront "adversity without underestimating or overestimating the danger; that is, fearing things to the extent that it is reasonable to fear them and acting accordingly. Courageous individuals recognize danger and do not take unreasonable risks with life or limb with regard to self or others."<sup>48</sup>

At this point, we can now make an assessment of the truth of line 1. Since Cohen's virtue account satisfies the conditions of what we typically think most, if not all, virtue theory versions possess, line 1 is true. Thus, since the argument is valid and both premises are true, then the conclusion, viz., LBT cannot remain morally neutral toward its counselees, must be true and worthy of belief.

## **Responses to the Challenge to Cohen's Link between Logic-Based Therapy and the Virtues**

The argument above casts a dark shadow over Cohen's attempt to construct a positive psychotherapy. That said, before we give in to the rising tide of victory, perhaps we should think about whether the premises of the above argument are true. Are there reasons to think that lines 1 and 2 may be false? I think there are good reasons to doubt line 2, and during that discussion, it should become clear why I think line 1 is true again.

I will now evaluate the truth-value of line 2. Are there any reasons to doubt whether it is true? In other words, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the antecedent is true, are there reasons to think that LBT *can* remain morally neutral toward its counselees? This depends upon whether LBT can distance itself from the "second-order" values of its counselees. Unfortunately, I don't think that's possible. The LBT counselor focuses almost exclusively on the "second-order" values of the counselee because it is the "second-order" values which cause problems at the "first-order" level of choices.<sup>49</sup> Here's what I mean.

I worked as a philosophical consultant at a local detention center near my home in Illinois. It is a State-run institution, and at the time, the State of Illinois could not afford to pay to have professional counselors come to the detention center and offer counseling services to its one-thousand (plus) inmates. Although I could only help one day a week, I would see as many inmates as I could. Some of the inmates I talked with I only saw once or twice. Others I met with on a weekly basis. Here's an example of one of sessions I had with an inmate who I met with on a weekly basis. I refer to him as L.

When I first met L, he was very sad because his mother recently died. He blamed himself for her death. L concluded that he should be dead instead. When I asked him why, he said that the death of his mother was his fault because he disappointed her so much. After he mentioned this point, I asked L why he worried so much about disappointing his mother (we also talked

about why he thought disappointing his mother killed her). We talked for a while about this. Eventually, he realized that he thought that he *should* never disappoint the individuals he was really close to, especially his mother.<sup>50</sup> Once I heard that, I knew I had to get him to rethink his position about disappointing people. But now the problem should be a little more in focus: L's need not to disappoint his loved ones and his mother is a "second-order" value, i.e., it's a value which he uses to make "first-order" decisions. After that, I presented an antidote which was guided by the "second-order" value of metaphysical security. This means that I directed L to habituate himself to control what is in his power and give up those things he cannot control.<sup>51</sup> Thus, it seems unlikely that LBT can remain morally neutral toward its counselees.

What then, if anything, can be brought forward to save LBT from this complaint? Maybe this will ease the problem. Although Cohen aligns LBT to the virtues, and historically speaking, to the history of virtue theory, it's not clear that he treats the virtues in the same way that an advocate of a virtue theory may do so. But why is that? I think the answer is simple. In general, there are a number of factors associated with morality. I mentioned a few associated with virtue theories. But there is an additional factor associated with all moral theories, viz., "certain *sanctions* or additional sources of motivation that are also often expressed in verbal judgments, namely, holding responsible, praising, and blaming. . . ." <sup>52</sup> So, such sanctions, even if verbal, can often provide deep sources of incentives for individuals to bring their attitudes, choices, emotions, and actions in line with the demands of morality. But now I think it is possible to show how LBT can maintain its commitment to counselee empowerment and to the virtues, while, at the same time, avoiding the problem of moral neutrality. Here's what I mean. LBT *is* connected to virtue moral theory (and thus line 1 is true), but LBT's counselors or consultants do not treat it like a moral theory. On the contrary, LBT practitioners are trained to avoid making moral

judgments about their counselees even if the counselees do not bring their lives in line with the virtues. There are no sanctions, whether verbal or otherwise, and no moral judgments are made about the counselee's choices or attitudes (even if the counselor finds one or both morally repugnant). This is so because LBT's virtues (whether the moral virtues or the cognitive virtues) are *guiding* virtues. In other words, the virtues are offered as attainable ideals (albeit moral ideals) for the attainment of the counselee's happiness.<sup>53</sup>

What, then, shall we make of this discussion? Here's my estimation: While there are reasons to think that line 1 is true, I think there are good reasons to think that line 2 is false. If I am correct, then the original argument is unsound.

## **Conclusion**

In this paper, I began by contrasting Cohen's Logic-based Therapy with an account of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy, Cognitive Behavior Therapy and Positive Psychology. Cohen draws the best aspects of all three to (partially) define his own approach. After that, Cohen's reliance upon guiding virtues was discussed. In this section, the guiding virtues are aligned with the set of fallacies people typically fall prey to. For example, I tried to make this clear by talking about the fallacy of demanding perfection and the corresponding guiding virtue of metaphysical security.

The focus of the paper then turned to the relationship between LBT and the guiding virtues. Initially, the relationship was described as suspicious because bringing a virtue account into a counseling setting adds an unwarranted normative element. Other than client empowerment, the moral judgments associated with a virtue theory account are inappropriate in most counseling contexts.

After talking at length why Cohen’s account of the guiding virtues counts as virtue theory account, I attempted to distance Cohen’s view from the moral implications brought forward by any moral theory. I was able to argue that even though LBT aims at the second-order autonomy of its clients, it can remain morally neutral toward the beliefs and behaviors of its counselees and still empower them to become better people.

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<sup>1</sup> Both psychotherapies, REBT and LBT, are traditional forms of Cognitive-Behavior Therapy (CBT). CBT is the view that

<sup>2</sup> Elliot D. Cohen, *Theory and Practice of Logic-Based Therapy: Integrating Critical Thinking and Philosophy into Psychotherapy* (New Castle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publication, 2013), 144.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Martin E. P. Seligman and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, "Positive Psychology: An introduction," *American Psychologist* 55 (1): 5–14.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 5. See also, Martin E. P. Seligman, *Authentic Happiness* (New York: Atria, 2002), 17-29.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Cohen, *Theory and Practice of Logic-Based Therapy*, 144.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 145.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 150-151

<sup>13</sup> For more on this distinction, see William Frankena, *Ethics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1973), 63-65.

<sup>14</sup> Cohen, *Theory and Practice of Logic-Based Therapy*, 161.

<sup>15</sup> Recently, in an article in *Psychology Today*, Cohen replaces the term “transcendent” with the term “guiding.” The apparent implication is that he sees the virtues as guides to live a happier life. See, e.g., <https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/what-would-aristotle-do/201403/logic-based-therapy-go-guiding-virtues>.

<sup>16</sup> Cohen, *Theory and Practice of Logic-Based Therapy*, 154-169.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 177-185.

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<sup>18</sup> Elliot D. Cohen, *Critical Thinking Unleashed* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Pub., Inc., 2009), 255. Italics are in the text.

<sup>19</sup> Cohen, *Theory and Practice of Logic-Based Therapy*, 145.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 154.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 72 and 76.

<sup>23</sup> LBT makes a distinction a between philosophical counselors and philosophical consultants. The difference between the two is this: Philosophical counselors are individuals with either a Masters in philosophy or a Ph.D. in philosophy, certified in LBT, and holds (minimally) a Masters in a mental health profession. A philosophical consultant is an individual who holds a Masters in philosophy or a Ph.D. in philosophy and is certified in LBT. See the following webpage for a more comprehensive discussion: <http://npcassoc.org/practice-areas-boundaries/>.

<sup>24</sup> Epictetus *Discourses* 1.4.18-29 in *The Stoics Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia*, Brad Inwood and Lloyd P. Gerson, trans. (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2008), 195-196.

<sup>25</sup> Cohen, *Theory and Practice of Logic-Based Therapy*, 154.

<sup>26</sup> The focus of this conclusion was brought to my attention by my former student, Ms. Erica Nichols.

<sup>27</sup> Joseph Kupfer and Luann Klatt, "Client Empowerment and Counselor Integrity," *Professional Ethics* 2 (1993), 36. Reprinted in John Rowan and Samuel Zinaich, Jr., *Ethics for the Professions* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomas Learning, 2003), 308-314.

<sup>28</sup> Joseph Kupfer and Luann Klatt, "Client Empowerment and Counselor Integrity," *Professional Ethics* 2 (1993), 36.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 40.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Terence Irwin, ed. and trans. (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Pub., Co., Inc., 1999), 45-49.

<sup>35</sup> Cohen, *Theory and Practice of Logic-Based Therapy*, 166-168.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 166.

<sup>37</sup> Terrance McConnell, "Metaethical Principles, Meta-Prescriptions, and Moral Theories," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 22, 4 (October 1985), 299.

<sup>38</sup> William Frankena, *Ethics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1973), 14.



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<sup>39</sup> John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism* (including the 1868 Speech on Capital Punishment), 2nd ed, Ed. by George Sher (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 2001). Cf. Wendy Donner, “Mill’s Utilitarianism,” in Ed., John Skorupski, *The Cambridge Companion to Mill* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 255-292.

<sup>40</sup> Franken, *Ethics*, 14.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 63-64.

<sup>43</sup> Cohen, *Theory and Practice of Logic-Based Therapy*, 144.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 147.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 152.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 145-147.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 145. Cf. 150-151.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 161.

<sup>49</sup> Kupfer and Klatt discuss the autonomy associated with the beliefs at the first-order level and the autonomy associated with the values at the second-order level. Of second-order autonomy, Kupfer and Klatt write: “This is the ability to reflect critically on the values and commitments which underlie our first-order decisions” (Kupfer and Klatt, “Client Empowerment and Counselor Integrity,” 40). Additionally, they add the following: “Second-order autonomy includes actually choosing these values for oneself rather than accepting them unreflectively or simply imitating the valuing of others” (*Ibid.*). Finally, they add: “A person exercising second-order autonomy scrutinizes his values, notes conflicts and confluences among them, and modifies them in light of such scrutiny. Such a person typically also self-consciously decides what sort of person he wishes to become. . .” (*Ibid.*).

<sup>50</sup> LBT specialists call this the fallacy of demanding perfection. Such a fallacy contributes individuals to make unreasonable predictions and dogmatic demands. Cf. Cohen, *Theory and Practice of Logic-Based Therapy*, 75-78.

<sup>51</sup> Cohen, *Theory and Practice of Logic-Based Therapy*, 154-156.

<sup>52</sup> Frankena, *Ethics*, 9. Italics are in the text.

<sup>53</sup> Cohen, *Theory and Practice of Logic-Based Therapy*, 147.